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To the Editor: In response to 
the emergence of pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 virus (1), the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC) issued 
interim guidance for preventing spread 
of the pandemic virus in schools. 
Initial guidance recommended that 
dismissal of students be considered 
for schools with confi rmed cases of 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 infection. The 
guidance was subsequently revised to 
recommend monitoring for respiratory 
illness and exclusion of ill students 
until they were noninfectious, rather 
than dismissal.
In Chicago, Illinois, USA, the 
fi rst cases of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
infection were identifi ed on April 
28, 2009, of which 1 occurred in an 
elementary school student (2). In 
accordance with CDC guidance at the 
time, the school (school A) was closed 
for 1 week, April 29–May 5, 2009. 
CDC and the Chicago Department 
of Public Health investigated 
respiratory illnesses among students 
and their households during the period 
surrounding the school closure.
A telephone survey of students’ 
households was conducted during 
May 15–20, 2009 (3). One adult 
member of each household was asked 
whether any household members had 
been “sick with cold or fl u symptoms 
or fever” since April 12. Age, date 
of illness onset, and symptoms and 
signs (fever, cough, sore throat, 
rhinorrhea or nasal congestion [runny 
or stuffy nose]) were recorded. Acute 
respiratory illness was defi ned as 
>1 symptom or sign from the list 
provided. Infl uenza-like illness was 
defi ned as fever plus cough or sore 
throat. Reports were excluded if 
onset date was before April 12 or 
unknown. Descriptive analysis was 
performed, and household attack rates 
were calculated. Dates of onset were 
used to evaluate timing of illness in 
relation to school closure and possible 
transmission within households. 
The investigation was approved as 
nonresearch by CDC.
Of 609 eligible households, 
439 (72%) had a working telephone 
number, of which 170 (39%) 
completed the survey. Thirty-nine 
(23%) households, representing 181 
persons, reported 58 illnesses that 
met the acute respiratory illness 
defi nition, of which 37 (64%) also met 
the infl uenza-like illness defi nition. 
Median age was 10 years (range <1–
48 years). Of 57 household members 
for whom age and student status were 
recorded, 42 (74%) were students at 
school A. Thirty-four (60%) reported 
onset of symptoms before or on the 
day of school dismissal (Figure).
Household attack rates ranged 
from 10% to 100% (median 25%). Five 
(13%) households reporting illness 
had no ill students who attended school 
A. In 4 of 11 households reporting >2 
illnesses, students became ill before 
nonstudent household members. In the 
remaining 7 households, onset dates 
did not suggest student-to-nonstudent 
transmission.
Even though the school was 
closed almost immediately after the 
fi rst pandemic (H1N1) 2009 case was 
confi rmed in a student, onset of ≈60% 
of reported illnesses occurred before 
or on the day of school dismissal, 
suggesting that unrecognized trans-
mission was already occurring in the 
school or community. These results 
are supported by data on confi rmed 
cases of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
in Chicago, which suggest that 
community transmission was high 
during the survey period (2). Our 
results also indicated that at least some 
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Figure. Respiratory illness in households of school-dismissed students during the pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 outbreak, Chicago, Illinois, USA, 2009. Arrows indicate dates when school A 
closed and reopened.
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illness among school A households 
originated from sources other than 
the school and support the approach 
of considering school dismissal only 
in conjunction with other community 
mitigation strategies.
In Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region, People’s 
Republic of China, where all primary 
schools, kindergartens, and child care 
centers were immediately closed for 
14 days after identifi cation of the 
fi rst local case of pandemic (H1N1) 
2009, school closures were concluded 
to have substantially decreased 
transmission (4). The applicability of 
these fi ndings to communities where 
such sweeping measures might be less 
acceptable is unclear.
If school dismissal is considered 
as a strategy, dismissal early in the 
pandemic most likely would have the 
most impact, depending on duration of 
dismissal, other mitigation measures, 
and compliance with social distancing 
recommendations (which was mixed 
during the 2009 pandemic [3,5]). 
Polling of parents whose children 
experienced school dismissal showed 
high acceptance of short-term (3–5 
days) dismissals and low economic 
impact, especially on lower income 
families (3,6). However, dismissal for 
longer periods needs to be balanced by 
the adverse impact on education, loss 
of student services, and socioeconomic 
impact on families (7–9).
This investigation was limited 
by the relatively low response rate; 
however, demographics for the sample 
in our study were similar to those of 
the school as a whole (3). Other 
limitations included the exclusive use 
of reported symptoms to document 
illness, possible unrecognized 
asymptomatic cases, and absence of 
similar data from later in the pandemic. 
The 1-week closure period might not 
have provided enough information to 
capture any effect, and comparative 
data were not available from schools 
that were not dismissed during the 
pandemic. Further investigation is 
needed to evaluate the effi cacy and 
impact of school dismissal, including 
the timing of dismissal in relation to 
recognition of cases in a school or 
community and the impact of school 
dismissal relative to other community 
mitigation strategies.
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Pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 Virus in Swine 
Herds, People’s 
Republic of China
To the Editor: During March 
and early April 2009, a new swine-
origin infl uenza A (H1N1) virus 
emerged in Mexico and the United 
States; this virus subsequently spread 
across the globe by human-to-human 
transmission at an unprecedented rate. 
Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus also 
affected pigs. On May 2, 2009, the 
Canadian Food Inspection Agency 
notifi ed the World Organisation for 
Animal Health that the novel infl uenza 
A virus had been confi rmed on a pig 
farm in Alberta, Canada. Infection 
of pigs with pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
virus has been observed in multiple 
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